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AUTHOR INTERVIEWED

HOWARD MILLER: Good evening ladies and gentlemen. It's nice being with you again. In accordance with John Coleman's wintry weather forecast for tonight and for this weekend, I think we're in the right place this evening, in the war cozy surroundings of your living room. Thank you for inviting us. My guest tonight--and we're going to discuss the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States Government, is a man who has written a novel on that subject matter. His name is Victor Marchetti. His book is called, "The Rope Dancer." We welcome him to Chicago and to the Chicago program. Thank you for being here, Victor.

If there's adversary to this program, because Victor is definitely a critic of the CIA, the man who will represent the affirmative that the CIA is doing a remarkably fine job, is a Professor of Government. His name is Dr. Kellis, Dr. James Kellis, and we welcome the good doctor to our program, and hope that as an adversary he will stand and uphold the CIA. Is that generally your attitude; the way you feel about the CIA?

JAMES KELLIS: Well, I would agree with--in--in some points with Victor. Of course there are some discrepancies, some flaws and some failings in the CIA. But, generally, I think the long review, having been in this game longer than Victor has, I feel that the CIA is being--doing a reasonably good job and we can't expect perfection. CIA been in--has been in being for only 25 years. The British Intelligence has been functioning for four hundred years. They still make mistakes there.

HOWARD MILLER: Victor, I'm curious as to why the "Rope Dancer," being fiction, you would use as a chronicle of our times, as your critique of the CIA, rather than to write a non-fiction piece.

VICTOR MARCHETTI: Well, originally I wanted to write a non-fiction piece, a critical analysis of the--not only the CIA but of the US Intelligence System. But at the time, immediately after leaving the agency, I had a lot of security hang-ups and loyalties to my old colleagues, and I didn't want to do that. In the novel, I

was able to---to dramatize the position of an individual who is changing. His outlook on life is changing, along with the changing national scene. And feels that the institution he's working for is, in this case, the mythical National Intelligence Agency, is not keeping pace with these changes in society, and is actually living in the past: in other words, still fighting the cold war in a period when he believes that it is ending.

HOWARD MILLER: Are you Mr. Franklin in the book?

MARCHETTI: Well, to some extent, but--one has to use a model for every character one draws. I would say that I am partly Mr. Franklin, several good friends of mine are the other parts--

MILLER: Composite of many of the agents of the CIA. Now your criticism, mainly, of the CIA, is the fact that it has become cumbersome, that there is the redundancy of service within the organization, what basically is your criticism?

MARCHETTI: Well, I'll straighten you out on that. My criticism isn't focused especially on the CIA. I'm thinking in terms of the CIA and the US Intelligence Community, which includes the National Security Agency, the DIA, National Reconnaissance Organization; all the other facets of intelligence. I'm not talking about only the CIA but I'm talking about the six billion dollar a year industry that has upwards to 200,000 people working for it, the US Intelligence System. And I think it's--it's too big, and too costly, to begin with.

MILLER: Dr. Kellis, you began in the Intelligence Service as a member of the OSS, which of course--

KELLIS: That's correct. I started in 1942 with the OSS. We grew too fast. During the war we had about 25,000 Americans in the OSS. They were very selective. We had some very wonderful people, extremely dedicated, a lot of them worked with fast shooters behind the lines. I was in the Balkans and in China, both places. And, afterwards, I remained in the CIA because I was a regular airforce officer while I was assigned to the OSS. I remained with the CIA until 1964. My last assignment was Director of the Operations Division in the covered area. I thought that the agency grew up a little bit too fast. We made a lot of serious mistakes.

And I found myself at the time in a similar position with Victor. I really--I was very upset with it, I went and saw Mr. Dallas, objected to a lot of things we were doing. I eventually was re-assigned to the air force and I was in NATO Intelligence, but even then I saw the President--President Eisenhower, and had a discussion with him about the possibility of improving Intelligence. I--later on, when I left the service, I went into politics. I'm a Democrat. I'm very active in politics, and I talked to President Kennedy. I had a long friendship with him and his brother, Robert Kennedy. But I--I realized that we can make a lot of mistakes and we should expect it because it's a new agency, a new area.

This country moved from a period of isolation in 1940 to a period of deep involvement. We didn't have the experience, not only in foreign affairs, but even in Intelligence. We can expect some mistakes.

MILLER: You didn't have the personnel trained for that job--

KELLIS: Of course--

MILLER: The point--a point I wanted you to make, doctor, so that the audience can thoroughly understand the total intelligence establishment, what are the rankings of these various agencies--CIA, for instance, as compared to--

KELLIS: CIA, of course, is the top national intelligence agency, which is an operating agency, as well as a coordinating agency. In addition, you have a Defense Intelligence Agency, which is heading the whole defense department intelligence activity--

MILLER: Army, Navy, Marine Corps--

KELLIS: The Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence, and you have the National Security Agency, which is a code breaking organization. Also it's a military organization. Then you have the State Department, which has a research intelligence organization. You have the Atomic Energy and the FBI. There are nine organizations associated with the intelligence community in Washington.

MILLER: Now what you're saying generally, Victor--Mr. Marchetti, is that the need for these nine is not apparent today in our modern society?

MARCHETTI: No, I'm not saying that at all. I--believe in intelligence and I believe it exists and think we need it just as we need police forces and we need an army, defense forces. I'm saying that intelligence is too big. I'm saying that it is not well directed internally, and I'm saying that it needs more control from the outside, particularly from Congress. I also feel that there are some other lesser issues but which are very important and will--and could be potentially very important; such as the military influence, the clandestine mentality, and the--the old cold war attitude towards international relations in this day and age.

MILLER: Well, the point I'm trying to make or get to, and I'm presume I'm rather cumbersome in getting to it because you seem to take exception to that question. Let me put it another way. Is it not possible that we could have one agency to do all the intelligence in the United States Government. Why do you need nine different agencies? Isn't there a conflict of duties and responsibilities when you have nine doing basically the same work?

MARCHETTI: That's why I--I think there's a lot of duplication in intelligence today, and--Well, to begin with, we can define this a little more clearly. Today, in the collection effort in intelligence, the single most important ingredient insofar as the major tar-

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gets such as the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the like. It's technical intelligence. This is collection by satellite and radar's various electronic devices. And this is a very expensive process, but it's very good when it works. Everybody in the intelligence business today knows this, so everybody wants a part of the action. If the CIA, for example, decides--makes a break-through in the state of the art, say in over-the-horizon radar, so that they can monitor Soviet missile test facilities from way off, and they want to build a big radar to do this, immediately some other intelligence service, the army or the air force, will start beating the drums for a system of their own, that is going to essentially duplicate the system that CIA wants to put in.

MILLER: All right. You've made a good point now. Let me take a break. Right here is a convenient spot. We'll be right back as we discuss the CIA espionage spying around the world by the United States government. We'll be back in just a moment with Dr. Kellis and Mr. Marchetti on Chicago.

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MILLER: Dr. Kellis, Mr. Marchetti has just made what he thinks and what sounds like a significant point in the fact that there is duplication of services because of, apparently, a jealousy, an avarice on the part of these various departments or agencies, to have what some other agency does have. Have you found this to be the case in your work with the OSS?

KELLIS: There is a little duplication, but the need for those agencies to function independently is necessary. For example, the military are the best in collecting and evaluating military type of intelligence. The State Department is not. Obviously, the FBI is not. The FBI deals only in specific areas. Now this was part of the National Security Act of 1947. The CIA would not usurp the functions of other independent agencies. There is also an advantage, on occasion, when you have a little overlapping and you get various sources of information, you'd be able to verify that information.

If you have only one source, you may run into errors repeatedly. So, the little duplication is not bad. Now, the cost is a little bit high today, but, of course, the reason for it is the military intelligence agencies have expanded because of the war in Southeast Asia. Normally, the so-called six million--billion dollars--I don't think it's six billion. I would estimate it's normally about three billion dollars and under normal conditions maybe less, maybe two billion or less.

MARCHETTI: Oh no, it's much more than that doctor--

KELLIS: Well, it depends, as I said, where you cut off the functions of intelligence. If you are going to include every intelligence officer down to the battalion level or regimental level you can sky-rocket that to five or six billion dollars. If you keep it at the national level, where it should properly be, it is only 2.5 billion dollars. I think it should be that.

MILLER: Now, what is the--the association between the Pentagon and the various other branches or the agencies of intelligence. Obviously they're close to the DIA. How close would they be to the CIA, the Pentagon?

MARCHETTI: Well, it all depends on the specific issue, but let me just answer doctor on this--this one point of the cost of the money. If you take CIA's budget today, the NSA's budget, the Na--the money that goes into the National Reconnaissance Organization and the DIA, without getting down into the departmental or service units, you are at 4.5 billion dollars.

MILLER: Yah, let's not belabor what it costs. I think anything the government spends money on, they probably spend two dollars for every dollar's service they get in return anyway, so I don't think that's the issue. The issue is how do we make our intelligence greater, because, I think, mutually we agree that intelligence is a very, very fine function, in--in government today. There's no doubt about that.

MARCHETTI: Well, to begin with, you have to have good collection. The analyst is only as good as his collection. Now I--prior to going up to the executive suite was a Soviet military specialist, and worked on such problems as the anti-ballistic missile problem, ICBM problem. The information there--the most important information that we had, was that which was collected from--by technical means. Once you had, let's say, I don't want to reveal any sources and methods in any kind of detail--but once you have information as to the location of a missile site and its status, you only need a periodic check on it to make sure that--

MILLER: At any missile site--

MARCHETTI: At any missile site that it was still there. One did not need to collect information on it on a weekly basis, because changes just cannot be made that rapidly. When you have, say, a radar that is monitoring certain missile testings, the information that this radar gets is the only information that you need. Another radar will not add to the--to your knowledge. In--in some cases the other radar will--will--if it collects the information at all, it simply duplicates it.

MILLER: Well, now, is most of our spying, most of our espionage, done electronically, or is it done still by the human--by the 007 who drops in parachutes behind lines and so forth, as you did during the war years?

KELLIS: Well, some functions, I think, could be done through technical means, electronics. Other functions done by human beings, and others done purely by research through open means, too. I think it is a mixture of all three of them. I think cross-checking and cross-feeding of all of them gives you the best answer. And this, I'm saying again brings us back, that you may have so many agencies appear to duplicating each other. But actually they reinforce each other. I don't think it would be wise to eliminate, for example, the State Department or the

Atomic Energy because they are the best qualified.

MILLER: Well, is there good communication between these nine agencies, or is--does that avarice or jealousy come up--

KELLIS: There is a little jealousy, but I believe there is reasonably good communication between them.

MILLER: Now, it seems to me, Mr. Marchetti, that your major criticism if I read Newsweek and Time and the other people who have reviewed your departure from your high-ranking position in the CIA, is that you claim it is para-military--that the CIA can actually start wars at the behest of the President of the United States. Can you document that charge?

MARCHETTI: Why sure. I mean the CIA has documented it itself. It--in its activities in Guatemala, in Cuba, and in certain other areas, they have recently said before the Fulbright Committee, when Jim Lowenstein and Dick Moose went out there and did that very interesting study on the scope of the Laotian war. They said yes, you know, we were doing this at the bequest of the President. And, it has been since supported by two other Presidents. It started in '62 under Kennedy, Johnson said to continue it, and Nixon said to continue it.

KELLIS: Well, I take exception to that. I don't think the CIA started the war in Laos. The Vietnamese invaded--in fact the Laos invaded Laos, in violation of the Geneva Accord of 1954. The CIA was there--sent there by the government--our government, to enforce the Laotian government. I don't think the CIA started the war. I think in most instances the CIA did not start the war. They were sent at the bequest of the local government--or some high official of our own government.

MILLER: In other words, that intelligence agency went to Laos when we felt the need.

KELLIS: Of course.

MILLER: Had it not been for the North Vietnamese invading that country and using it as a sanctuary, there was no reason for the CIA to go there in the first place.

KELLIS: That's right. I think it is an injustice to say that CIA started the war. It is not. The (word unclear) has been the other side, and we--In the early part of 1947 when the CIA started, it was purely an intelligence agency: collecting, assessing, evaluating, disseminating information. They didn't want to get involved in political action programs, guerilla warfare, political action, and things of that sort. But they saw that the other side, the Soviet Union, Communist China, the satellite nations, were very deeply involved in this area. And many nations came to this country and asked for help.

As you recall, Western Europe was in bad shape. At one time in 1948, the Italian Communists nearly won the elections. And how did they

of Soviet affairs. They have import and export houses in Italy and in France, exclusively controlled by the Communists. And they--they of course, they deal with Eastern Europe and Russia. And all the profits of those houses go into the Communist Party of that country. Through those, of course, they--they support their newspapers, they support the Party apparatus, the election machinery and everything else. I--well, we allow those things to go on. I think that many countries would have gone under long ago. So this function, then, of supporting various governments in danger of this nature, was lodged into the CIA in spite of CIA's unwillingness to undertake it, really. In fact, the first officer in charge of this area was a State Department officer transferred from the State Department to take over this function of CIA.

MILLER: Let's take a break here. Just one second, doctor. We'll be right back as we continue the interesting story of intelligence in our government, on Chicago.

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MILLER: Gentlemen, with your permission I'd like to wire in our audience now and let them participate with us in some of these questions. Line One, you're on Chicago with Dr. Kellis and Mr. Marchetti.

CALLER: Uh, yes. My question is, I'd like to know if there's any truth that the CIA has sponsored several left wing groups to cause a domestic crisis in America.

MILLER: Mr. Marchetti, I think in view of your recent departure from the agency, you're probably in a better position to answer that.

MARCHETTI: To the best of my knowledge, they have never sponsored a left wing group to encourage any kind of dissent or trouble in this country.

MILLER: OK, sir? We've answered your question--

KELLIS: I concur to that remark.

MILLER: You would concur doctor?

KELLIS: Yes.

MILLER: All right. Line Two, you're on Chicago.

CALLER: Uh, yes. I'd like to know if the CIA was involved in the recent expulsion of Soviet spies from England.

KELLIS: To the best of our knowledge, CIA was not. This was done by the British Security. There were 105 of them. And this, of course, raised the question that this type of warfare still continues there.

MILLER: Now, is there an exchange of intelligence data between Allies, though?

KELLIS: Between some of the Allied services, yes. And some of them are very, very good. For example, the--the British are good. The Israeli's, by the way, are excellent--very good for a small country. They have one of the best intelligence agencies in the world.

MILLER: And you do have an exchange of ideas? If they come across information that would be of service--

KELLIS: Well, there is a limited exchange in some areas, of course.

MILLER: Did you find that to be the case when you worked the desk in CIA?

MARCHETTI: Yes, there is an exchange with certain Allies, and some of them are better than others. There are special--it depends on the problem they're handling. The doctor said that the British are very good, and they are in certain fields. But, in some fields they're--I found them to be very, very weak and highly dependent upon US Intelligence.

MILLER: Would agree with Dr. Kellis' appraisal, though, of the Israeli Service?

MARCHETTI: Yes. They're very good in their area.

MILLER: But they're not as world wide as--

MARCHETTI: Well, I think--I think Dr. Kellis would agree with me that there are probably only two really good intelligence services in the world, and that's KGB and the--

MILLER: Of Russia--

MARCHETTI: Of Russia, yes. And the US Intelligence Service.

MILLER: Not the CIA?

KELLIS: I think there are four. I'll say the British are equally as good, and, for the--for a country like Israel, I think they rank very high. For dollar and man they have in their service as good as any.

MILLER: Well, as I recall, in World War II, we had a tremendous respect, didn't we, for the Japanese Intelligence?

MARCHETTI: Well, I'm not--I'm not--I just don't know that much about the World War II--

MILLER: Doctor, you would know.

KELLIS: Well, I was in the Far East. Of course, they've just

organized their intelligence services now. They have not moved to-- In World War Two they were reasonably good, but not too good, really. The German Intelligence Service was better.

MILLER: Was better than the Japanese?

KELLIS: That's right.

MILLER: And we were better than the Germans during World War Two?

KELLIS: Initially we were not; we'd just started to organize our services at that time. The British were the best throughout the war, in my estimation.

MILLER: Do you have a good training program, now, doctor and Victor, for young men coming into the Service--in the government Service?

KELLIS: I believe we do. I don't know. Victor has had more recent experience, maybe.

MARCHETTI: I'd say, generally speaking, it's a good training program. But, today, it's--intelligence is highly specialized. To begin with, the people come to it with a great deal of talent; and then they're highly trained on the job.

MILLER: What do they look for when they look for spies? A dramatic word, of course, spies. Today it's a blue collar job.

MARCHETTI: Well, I tell you. The number of spies today is very, very small in the intelligence business. You have many more analysts...and people who process intelligence information, or, indeed research and collection experts who are designing new collection systems and the like.

MILLER: And I suppose there's a lot of volunteer informants. They would come into the spy heading more than anything else, wouldn't they? Aren't there--

MARCHETTI: You mean a walk-in? Someone who--somebody who decides he no longer agrees with his nation and offers his services? Oh yes. In fact this is one of the major ways that agents are acquired.

MILLER: We have a phone caller. Line Three you're on Chicago.

CALLER: Yes, Mr. Miller. I'd like to ask the question, how about the recruiting of these agents at various universities or through the services, and also, what about actual applicants coming into the CIA office here in the Washington, D.C.--Virginia area? Do they actually have an open office where anyone can apply for a job with the CIA?

MILLER: All right, Victor. You just left a short while ago.

MARCHETTI: They do--they do, yes. You can go to Rosalind, Vir-

ginia--in the Rosalind business area, just across Key Bridge from Washington, and find the CIA personnel office; walk up and knock on the door and say you'd like to apply for a job. They'll take your name, ask you to fill out a form, and--you know, perform a background check, of course. (cough)Excuse me. So if the--but that is not the way most people are hired in the CIA today. Most people--young officers, are hired from the--usually from university campuses because the individual is or has studied some subject that the agency is interested in. It may be in the sciences, it may be economics, it could be Soviet studeis, Chinese language. They also recruit in the highschoools for secretaries and for young--young men to be the less difficult jobs, such as curriers and the like.

MILLER:There's very little cloak and dagger stuff anymore in--in top espionage, is there?

MARCHETTI: I would say that--that, looking at the entire US Intelligence System, that this is a--probably accounts for something like, maybe, ten percent of the entire intelligence effort today.

MILLER: Now, when you were dropped behind the lines during the war, that's the day of the cloak and dagger work, wasn't it? During the war years, doctor?

KELLIS: Out of the 25,000 members of the OSS, only about 1700 were parachuted--they would go behind the lines.

MILLER: Still a small number.

KELLIS: Very small.

MILLER: And your job there was to find out military establishments and--

KELLIS: Well, we worked with the guerrillas up in the mountains and then we had intelligence--we had to collect intelligence, we did sabotage, we did a little bit of everything. We had a integrated unit working with us.

MILLER: The main theory, of course, being to try to find enemy place--gun emplacements--

KELLIS: Note the installations, note the intelligence, do sabotage work. We organized guerrilla units, but we had a composite unit. I was a team leader, what they call. I had about seven, eight, Americans with me, who were parachuted in Greece. And I had about the same number of them in China, in North China. I don't look Chinese, I couldn't pass like one, but I had some Chinese Americans with me who spoke the language, they were very capable persons, and dedicated.

MILLER: All right. Let's go back to the phones now. Line Six, you're on Chicago.

CALLER: Good evening, Mr. Miller.

CALLER: Fine, sir. I have a two part question, if I may.

MILLER: Sure.

CALLER: The first part is, I'd like to--I'd like your guests to comment on the CIA if--I'm wondering if they had any part of the action Mr. Diem was overthrown in, subsequently machine-gunned. My other question is, does the CIA--is the CIA involved in any--in anything that he could speak about, such as the Francis Gary Powers flights which, if I remember correctly, and I may not--Francis Gary Powers was brought down or his plane had a malfunction and he crashed over Russia. And, at the time, the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, apparently was not aware that these flights were going on, because, as I remember it, Mr. Eisenhower took the position that we would not have these flights.

Mr. Krushchev took much delight in showing the pictures of Mr. Powers and the aircraft in Russia. I think that was the situation, where the United States government was severely embarrassed by the world.

MILLER: Yes, and as a matter of fact, as I recall, President Eisenhower had to cancel his trip to Russia in light of that embarrassment. Victor, do you want to comment?

MARCHETTI: Well, I--I think the viewer or the caller has his story a little confused there. The White House was aware that the U-2 flights were being performed. Now, they--the President may not--may not have known that every--of every flight as it took place, but he had approved surveillance of the Soviet Union by U-2's. On the Gary Powers flight, the--it was probably poor judgment to run a flight at that particular time since they--Krushchev and Eisenhower were getting ready to meet in Paris at a summit conference.

Unfortunately, it was just one of these things that happen in the bureaucracy. The flight was suggested, it was approved, and he either had a malfunction or was hit by a SA-2 missile and crashed. Now, President Eisenhower at first took the standard position of any President or Prime Minister and that is, he disclaimed any knowledge of the event. Once the cat was out of the bag and they showed the wreckage and Powers, they he reversed himself and he said, yes, we were doing it. It was necessary for us to do it in order to know what the Soviets were doing in the strategic strike field, and he took responsibility for it and--and defended the intelligence community.

MILLER: Are we still doing those over-flights on a regular basis, as far as you know?

KELLIS: You mean air? It isn't necessary any more. You have the satellites--

MILLER: The satellites can do it--the satellite is the millennium then in espionage work, is that it?

KELLIS: They're doing a better job than any aircraft would do.

MARCHETTI: It's almost too good. The satellites are getting so good and communication is so very, very good, that we're virtually --we're on the verge of--of a real time system. That is, where a satellite--there will always be some sort of a satellite over the target areas, reporting back either photographic or other kinds of information almost simultaneously with when it is seen. And, the analyst will be sitting there in front of a--fantastic machines. It's more than the mind can cope with.

MILLER: You won't need an analyst anymore. All you'll need is a reader. We going to be back in just a moment on Chicago.

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MILLER: Now the last caller has a two part question. And we answered inversely, I think, in order of his--his request. Dr. Kellis, are you familiar with the Diem situation and--

KELLIS: I was not in the CIA but I have discussed it with some high officials of the CIA, and they told me that they were not directly involved in the killing of Diem. But they had close contact and liason with the military officers who pulled the coup de tat. And they were eventually responsible, of course, for the killing of Diem and his brother, of course.

MILLER: In other words, the CIA was a part of it, but not endorsed by the government or the posture of the government of the United States.

KELLIS: The CIA was in contact with the military officers, they had the information, they knew what they were doing. They were not directing them. They were purely on their own.

MILLER: In other words, the White House knew that Diem was going to be assassinated--

KELLIS: No, they did not. They knew there was--

MILLER: The CIA knew--

KELLIS: No. The CIA knew that there would be a military coup de tat taking place to overthrow Diem. They knew that.

MILLER: Well, if you know that there's going to be a coup de tat, isn't it always the case that the ruling power who is victimized by the coup de tat is always assassinated--very seldom is he privileged to live.

KELLIS: Well, not necessarily. No, actually even the CIA and our own government were surprised when they went to that extreme.

MILLER: They thought they'd just turn him loose on the streets?

KELLIS: They thought they may--they may restrict him or put him in jail or something of that sort.

MILLER: What's your opinion of the Diem situation, Victor?

MARCHETTI: Well, essentially, my understanding of it is essentially the same as--as Dr. Kellis' understanding of it. But, this is what I think the trouble is--that the President can use intelligence almost as a private tool for his foreign policy maneuvering, without clearing it with enough people in Congress, or without informing the public. He can say, for example, that things are not going well in--in South Vietnam. And there's a lot of unrest and Diem is not good for us, we'd better side in with someone else, or you better do something about it. And this he can do on his own, and as the Commander In Chief and President of the United States.

When it works, fine. I guess. But when it doesn't work, when it backfires, then--then the country is greatly embarrassed, and--

MILLER: Well, are you saying then that there's too much power vested in the Presidency of the United States? Is that the criticism of it? Certainly, as Commander in Chief you can't make knowledge or privvy to all the Senators, all the things that take place in espionage work.

MARCHETTI: Well, I think you can make more--make the Senators more aware of more things that are going on in the intelligence field. Now, this, of course, gets into the argument between the Executive branch and the Legislative branch, and they're both very jealous of their prerogatives. But, to take, for example, the ABM debate that was going on for the past two years. Now, Senators like Senator Cooper, who were involved in making of the big decision on whether the United States should deploy or not, were unable to get classified information on the ABM problem, so that they could make a clear and intelligent judgment.

The reason they were told they couldn't get this information, was that it was secret and they--you know couldn't be--they had no need to know. The CIA had it, and they gave it to the President exclusively.

KELLIS: That's right.

MILLER: --so that he heard one side of the story that--

KELLIS: Well, I have to--

MARCHETTI: And they would leak information. The White House would leak information and the Department of Defense would leak information supporting their side of the argument. Well, eventually on this particular issue, it was decided to clue in some of the Senators and let them--

MILLER: Uh, doctor?

KELLIS: I take exception of the statement made here by Victor. Surely, the President can take advantage of the CIA or the State De-

partment or the Defense Department and take certain actions abroad. That's his prerogative as President of the United States. He's in charge of our foreign policy. This is the first part, so there's nothing wrong with it. He can order the intelligence to do certain things. It's part of the National Security Act of 1947. If it serves our purpose as a nation, he would do it. He should do it, too. You cannot criticize neither the CIA nor the President.

And the other part, informing Congress. Well, they would and they should inform Congress, when it comes to another question as to how much supervision or responsibility Congress should have over the CIA. I feel that they should have somewhat stronger supervision because I provisionally believe that the separation of powers, the checks and balances, should be affecting the CIA as it effects all agencies of the government.

MILLER: We'll pursue that tactic in just a moment, as we discuss the CIA, spying and espionage around the world on Chicago.

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MILLER: Gentleman, as that last caller evidenced an interest in Diem, that's almost ancient history by now. I'm equally interested in the Bay of Pigs. What's your appraisal of that situation? Did CIA good? Did President Kennedy goof? Did Bobby Kennedy goof? Certainly someone did. Who's responsible for the debacle of the Bay of Pigs?

KELLIS: I personally think that CIA was primarily responsible--we have to admit it. And I think CIA people admit it. They made a mistake.

MILLER: Where did they fail?

KELLIS: I think their assessment was by landing nearly 2000 exiles in Cuba, that Cuba would revolt against Castro. I think their estimate was wrong. Castro had very good control of Cuba and the loyalty of the people rested more on Castro than the exiles.

MILLER: But how do we know the CIA failed if the air strike that was supposed to furnish a cover to those 2000 failed to arrive? Is it not so that had those 2000 men had the military support as promised by the government of the United States, that perhaps then the people on the island would have thought there was a possibility for a successful revolt. When you start with 2000 people against the hordes of Castro, what chance did they have?

KELLIS: I have greatest doubts if even the air strike would have contributed to the success of this landing. Really, the main factor was, they did not have the support of the people in Cuba. This is precisely what has happened, in fact, in Vietnam and a lot of places in the world. In this type of activity you have to have the support of the people. I saw that when I was behind the lines in the Balkans or in China. You cannot survive without the support of the people.

MARCHETTI: I think the doctor's made a very good point, there, and going back to the Laotian situation, you have Laotian leaders today--one recently spoke out in the Washington Post. He says, "We don't even know what we're fighting for today." There's just a war going on. If you don't have the support of the people, you cannot throw out the--the revolutionaries, or the counter-revolutionaries. You've got to have their support, and they--and unfortunately, it was a bad intelligence estimate on Cuba.

Castro did have the support of the bulk of the people, even though a lot of the professional class and the other people who were living high off the hog in Cuba had left the country, and those that were there were unhappy. The people largely--

MILLER: The satisfied people already had moved the mine to Florida.

MARCHETTI: Exactly. Now we're trying to come back in.

MILLER: One of the claims you have made frequently to the press and public utterances, Victor, is that the President really has, through the CIA, an independent airforce that's military in nature or could be military in nature. What are those airforces that you're talking about?

MARCHETTI: What--what I'm talking about in--in this instance is things such as Air America and certain other smaller private--ostensibly private air organizations--air transport facilities.

MILLER: Southern Airlines or Southern Airways?

MARCHETTI: Well there's one that exists in Florida called Southern Air Transport. It's sole purpose is as a contingency of force in the event that the United States government would have to go into Latin America, the Caribbean black. This would give them the air capability to fly in men and materials.

MILLER: Well, with the thousands of military planes we have under the command of the airforce generals, why do we need these private air forces?

KELLIS: Because on some occasions they may not be allowed to--to land military aircraft. Let's take South America. I disagree, again, with Victor that his claims that the cold war is reducing in tension at this moment. Maybe the official international situation or military situation is being lessened in tensions. But, the cold war is continuing. Castro, for example, is supporting insurgent activities in six Latin American countries. You have guerrillas fighting in six countries. And the situation becomes very dangerous, those countries may turn to us and ask us for help.

We may not be able, maybe, to be--maybe not be wise for us to send the military there. We may have to send people--the CIA and other types to go there and do the job.

MILLER: But then aren't we creating another Laos or another Vietnam? If we believe thoroughly in our right to defend groups who want freedom under their--under their flag, what is so wrong about sending a military force there?

KELLIS: I--I'll tell you, first. I think that's the mistake we made in Southeast Asia. honestly, we should have allowed those people to fight their own war. We came in as successors to the French; we're looked upon as a colonial power. If we equipped and trained the Vietnamese to fight their own war, if we had built a substantial government that's respected and responsive to the people, I think it would have been a lot more successful.

MILLER: But we couldn't have trained the South Vietnamese speedily enough to have stopped the hordes from the North to overrun. It would have been too late by the time you'd trained, wouldn't it?

KELLIS: I think we have been in Vietnam since 1958. I think we had ample time to do it. Apparently, one decision was following the other on an ad hoc basis. And, I think we should have taken the long view and then trained and equipped the Vietnamese themselves to carry the war. And, above all, I think we should have insisted on having a good and responsive government.

MILLER: We're going to be back in just a moment on Chicago.

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MILLER: Gentlemen, as much as I like to look at the broad horizon intelligence, I would much prefer now in these last few moments that we have together, to pick your respective brains on the upcoming reproachment with China. What about this situation? I suppose CIA is a busy beehive of activity now, preparing the President of the United States with intelligence relative to Chinese current affairs and--

MARCHETTI: Oh, yes. They would be very, very active in this situation, providing him with background information on economics, politics, anything--military matters. They would be coordinating. The other intelligence agencies would also be contributing. I would think that in the CIA's case they would also have an eye to the future about--since China is a denied area and has been for 20 years--as to how best they could use this opportunity to operate a little more freely and acquire more information on the Chinese situation.

MILLER: Now you're familiar with the Chinese Intelligence. How do you assess their abilities, Dr. Kellis?

KELLIS: I have not dealt with them recently, but in the past--I don't--I did not find them very efficient. The Chinese Intelligence through the war and afterwards was not very competent.

MILLER: Their electronic surveillance, apparently, is minus--

KELLIS: Minus, that's correct. Technically they're behind, and their general intelligence, personnel intelligence, is weak. They have been

the general effort in foreign affairs is not particularly good.

MILLER: Doctor, with your vast experience, both as an Air Force officer as a member of the OSS, the Office of Strategic Services, and then the CIA, you must have some attitude prevalent in your mind relative to Mr. Nixon's trip to China. How do you assess this trip? What will he look for and how successful--will he meet success?

KELLIS: I think it's for the good. We have to try to lessen the tensions between us and China, and between us and the Soviet Union. We have to. And this is necessary, of course, if we are to wind up the situation in Southeast Asia because they are the two powers behind it. So I agree with the President in his efforts to try to reduce the tension in between us and China. I don't think it's going to be an easy thing. We're not going to break up the insulation or isolation of China for 20 years over night. It's going to be a tortuous road ahead of us.

But I hope we arrive at it. I hope we understand each other, and I hope we can avoid any major conflicts, not only with China, but as well as with Russia.

MILLER: Victor is an expert in Russian studies. You certainly must have been on top of the situation at the Siberian border between China and Russia. How close did those two great powers come to actual warfare?

MARCHETTI: There was some skirmishing at the border--

KELLIS: Yes, there was.

MARCHETTI: Yes there was and they came damn close. Fortunately cooler heads prevailed, both in Moscow and Peking, and they didn't actually come to the shoot-out. Well, I mean they had minor fire fights--artillery exchanges and actually, some infantry action. It frightened the Soviets greatly and they have since moved up quite a few troops onto the border and they have moved in nuclear weapons, as well.

MILLER: --that are there on the border, now?

MARCHETTI: On the border, yes. Tactical nuclear weapons are along the border.

MILLER: Many Americans have felt that maybe that was a phony hatred that existed there, and that these two powers were just trying to--to use a diversionary force against the powers of the United States or the Democratic nations of the world.

MARCHETTI: No, no, no. Any student of Communism will tell you that that's a very basic--(voices overlap)

KELLIS: --differences between the two countries.

MILLER: Is it possible that some day they would fight very quickly, Russia and China? Doctor?

KELLIS: It is possible, but not probable, in my estimation.

MILLER: Victor, do you agree?

MARCHETTI: I--I--yes, I think they would try to avoid it. But it can happen, a misjudgment.

MILLER: We're going to be back in just a moment on Chicago.

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MILLER: An excellent novel, ladies and gentlemen. But it's more than a novel, it's a thinly disguised version of the CIA as seen through the eyes of the author, a former high-ranking officer of the CIA, Mr. Victor Marchetti. The book, the novel, is called "The Rope Dancer," and I suggest that you pick it up at your bookstore. Victor, thank you very much for being here.

Doctor, for your brilliance in this entire field of espionage and intelligence, thank you very much for lending your knowledge to our program tonight. Certainly appreciate your appearance, both of you gentlemen. Thank you for being here.

MARCHETTI: Thank you.

MILLER: And, ladies and gentlemen, as always on Friday night, we like to thank the men who make all of this possible....

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